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Supplemental Workers' Compensation Awards and
the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co.
Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution provides
that each state shall give full faith and credit to the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of its sister states.1 Pursuant to
this constitutional mandate, each sovereign state is obligated to respect the laws and judicial determinations of the other states. The
full extent of this obligation, however, is not clearly defined in the
Constitution or the congressional implementation of the clause.2
The United States Supreme Court, through numerous applications
of the full faith and credit clause, has played a significant role in

1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
This provision was adopted by the framers of the Constitution with only brief debate or
explanation. A general unwillingness of the individual colonies to subordinate their laws and
judgments in the interest of justice prompted concern on the part of the framers. The full
faith and credit clause was the product of their concern. The records kept of the constitutional convention suggest that the clause was designed particularly to give a judgment rendered in one state some effect in a related action brought in another state.
The full faith and credit clause had appeared in somewhat similar form in the Articles of
Confederation. In the Articles, however, reference was made only to full faith and credit to
state judgments. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV. The brief debate held at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 did not explain the significance of the additions of statutes and
records to the clause. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 135, 174,
188, 445, 447-48, 483-84, 486, 488-89 (Max Farrand ed. 1911). For a brief account of the
constitutional history surrounding the clause, see Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153-55 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Reese and Johnson].
2. The precise effect to be given a judgment was not articulated in the Constitution, but
was deferred to Congressional deliberation. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Congress promptly responded to the constitutional directive, and during its first session passed legislation pursuant to article IV which provided that records and judicial proceedings of any state should
have such full faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they
had by law or usage in the courts of the state of origin. See 1 Stat. 122 (1790), 28 U.S.C.
§ 687 (1946). This provision remains the only express congressional statement on the matter. In 1948, in a general rewording of the implementing act, state statutes were added to
the list of protected state interests covered under the clause. This addition was made without debate and has been accorded little significance to date. See 62 Stat. 947 (1948), 28
U.S.C. § 1738. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Reese].
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defining the scope of the constitutional obligation.'
In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,4 the United States
Supreme Court examined the effect of the full faith and credit
clause upon state workers' compensation awards. In this case, the
Court was asked to determine whether an injured employee previously compensated under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Act was entitled to supplementary recovery in another jurisdiction.

3. With little constitutional or congressional guidance, the United States Supreme Court
assumed responsibility for determining the scope of the full faith and credit clause. The
congressional implementation of the mandate proposed that states strictly adhere to the
judicial determination of its sister states, affording those judgments the same effect and
validity in its courts as they received in the courts of their origin. At an early stage, the
Court adopted this approach in decisions applying the full faith and credit clause to state
money judgments. See generally Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 331 (1944) [hereinafter
cited as Cheatham].
In Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), a creditor sought to enforce a judgment
in the District of Columbia which he had obtained against a debtor in a New York court.
The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the debt must be relitigated in the
District. Justice Story, writing for the Court, found that the only inquiry necessary in light
of the 1790 statutory implementation concerned the effect of the judgment in the state
where the judgment was rendered. The Court held that since the judgment was conclusive
upon the parties in New York, it was equally conclusive in the District of Columbia.
Chief Justice Marshall enunciated a similar interpretation of full faith and credit in
Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat) 234 (1818). In this case, the Chief Justice found
that a New York debt judgment was enforceable in South Carolina. The full faith and credit
clause required that the judgment of a state court be given the same credit, validity and
effect in every other court as it had in the state of pronouncement.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court has applied the full faith and credit
clause to other types of state judgments in the same strict manner. Judgments held enforceable in sister states include tax judgments, Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S.
268 (1935); determinations of title to personal property, Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282
(1939); divorce decrees, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); and child support
decrees, Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). Defenses once offered to avoid
enforcement outside the state of pronouncement have gradually been rejected under the
Court's decisions. A state can no longer avoid its full faith and credit obligations because of
a conflicting public policy, Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); a conflicting statute of
limitations, Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 290 (1866); or a procedural difficulty,
Kenny v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 U.S. 411 (1920). As the Supreme Court observed
in Williams, the exceptions to the full faith and credit clause are few and far between. 317
U.S. at 295.
In advancing a strict application of the clause, the Supreme Court has placed great emphasis upon the clause's significance as a national unifying force. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948);
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320
U.S. 430, 439 (1943); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276 (1935). As
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the full faith and credit clause unites the fifty sovereign
states into a single nation and ensures that one state's interest does not develop into a force
capable of dominating the interest of another.
4. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
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The Court found that the full faith and credit clause permitted the
District of Columbia to grant a second award, even though the initial award was intended by Virginia as a final adjudication of the
parties' rights' Seven members of the Court agreed on this result.
The Court was seriously divided, 6 however, over the proper rationale for the decision. Consequently, supplemental workers' compensation awards remain in a confusing and uncertain position.
This article will examine the potential impact of the Thomas decision upon supplemental workers' compensation awards and upon
the operation of the full faith and credit clause in other contexts.
It will first provide an explanation of how previous workers' compensation decisions have resolved the full faith and credit clause
issue raised by the grant of a supplemental award. Next, the
Thomas decision will be discussed and critically analyzed. Finally,
this article will explore the ramifications of Thomas when applied
to future supplemental workers' compensation awards and to other
state judicial determinations.
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION CASES

Background
A workers' compensation award is a unique statutory remedy
available to employees injured while acting in the scope of their
employment. In its basic form, this remedy provides an injured
employee with a no-fault recovery against his employer.7 The employer, under the provisions of the state compensation statute,
agrees to pay a set amount irrespective of culpability, and waives
the traditional defenses available to him at common law.8 The employee, for his part, accepts his compensation award in lieu of any
other claims he may have against the employer arising from the
5. Id. at 285-86.
6. See notes 94-102 infra and accompanying text.
7. See generally A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1980) [hereinafter
cited as A. LARSON].
8. "A coPnpensation system, unlike a tort recovery, does not pretend to restore to the
claimant what he has lost; it gives him a sum which, added to his remaining earning ability,
if any, will presumably enable him to exist without being a burden to others." 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 7, § 2.50 at 11.
Under workers' compensation, an award may be granted even though the employer's conduct is flawless and the employee's action is negligent. The right to compensation is strictly
dependent upon whether the employee was injured in the scope of his employment. Id.,
§ 2.20 at 5. In exchange for limited liability, the employer agrees to forego the common law
defenses generally available to him in tort: assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and
the fellow-servant defense. Id., § 4.50 at 30.
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same injury."
Unlike a common law claim for damages, a compensation claim
is generally brought before a state administrative commission."0
The state agency is statutorily required to apply the workers' compensation law of the state in which it presides."1 A state court of
general jurisdiction becomes involved only in the event that one
party wishes to appeal the commission's decision.1 2 The commission proceeding generally entails an informal adjudication of the
issues arising out of the injury. This informality permits an expeditious determination of the employer's obligation and the employee's compensation needs. s
Under certain circumstances, an injured employee has a choice
of states in which to bring his compensation claim. This situation
typically arises when the employee enters into the contract of employment in one state but is injured in another state.' Both states,
by virtue of their association with the employee, are empowered to
9. The employee covered under a state compensation statute forfeits not only his common law action for negligence, but also any other statutory remedy which may be available
to him under state or federal law. E.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59;
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; Public Vessel Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 781-790; a defective machinery act, an automobile owner's liability act, or a scaffold act.
See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 7, § 65.00 et seq.
10. 3 A. LARSON, supra note 7, § 78.10 at 15-2.
11. This characteristic of compensation statutes is an essential component of the plurality's rationale in Thomas. See notes 82-91 infra and accompanying text. State legislatures
have, with virtual unanimity, restricted the choice of laws decision of a state industrial commission to the compensation law of the home state. The policy underlying this characteristic
involves the special nature of a compensation remedy. A compensation award is more than
the granting of a lump sum award. Larson describes the remedy as follows:
[A] highly developed compensation scheme . . . stays with the claimant from the
moment of the accident to the time he is fully restored to normal earning capacity. This may involve supervising an ongoing rehabilitation program, perhaps
changing or extending it, perhaps providing, repairing and replacing prosthetic
devices, and supplying vocational rehabilitation. Apart from rehabilitation, optimum compensation administration may require reopening of the award from time
to time for change of condition or for other reasons ...
4 A. LARSON, supra note 7, § 84.20 at 16-9.
A compensation remedy is potentially quite difficult to administer from outside the state
which creates the remedy. The cost and administrative burden that would fall upon a commission applying another state's compensation scheme is prohibitive. As a result of this
circumstance, the only law which a commission is authorized to apply is the compensation
scheme of its own state.
12. 3 A. LARSON, supra note 7, § 80.10 at 15-339.
13. Id., § 78.10 at 15-2.
14. The circumstances necessary to apply a particular state compensation statute are,
however, generally more complex than this example suggests. For a full discussion of state
limits upon applicability of a state compensation statute, see 4 A. LARSON, supra note 7,
§ 87.00 et seq.
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resolve the employee's claim and compel the proper relief.' 5 The
full faith and credit issue surfaces when the employee, having received workers' compensation in one state, seeks to supplement
this award in the other state. The issue raised in this context is
whether the full faith and credit clause prohibits the second state
from granting supplemental relief. The resolution of this issue has
historically been marked by confusion and uncertainty.
Early Approach
During the developmental stages of workers' compensation relief, a majority of state courts approved the granting of supplemental awards to employees who had previously recovered compensation in another state.' 6 The full faith and credit clause did not
proscribe additional benefits. Calculation of the second award included a crediting in the amount of the award rendered in the first
compensation proceeding.' 7 The fact that the first state had
granted compensation exclusive of any other claim at common law
was not controlling in the second jurisdiction.'
The justifications offered for granting supplemental awards va-

15. Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n, v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
16. Massachusetts: Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N.E. 847 (1933); McLaughlin's
Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N.E. 338 (1931). New Jersey: Miller v. National Chair Co., 127
N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804 (1941); Sweet v. Austin Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 381, 171 A. 684 (1934).
New York: Bach v. Hampden Sales Ass'n, 293 N.Y. 847, 59 N.E.2d 439 (1944); Gilbert v.
Des Lauriers Column Mould Co., 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N.Y. Supp. 274 (1917). South Carolina: Price v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 201 S.C. 484, 23 S.E.2d 744 (1942). Wisconsin: Salvation Army v. Industrial Comm'n, 219 Wis. 343, 263 N.W. 349, 101 A.L.R. 1440 (1935);
Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N.W. 889 (1931). Contra, New
Mexico: Hughey v. Ware, 34 N.M. 29, 276 P. 27 (1929). New York: Minto v. Hitching & Co.,
204 App. Div. 661, 198 N.Y. Supp. 610 (1923). Tennessee: Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler &
T. Co., 163 Tenn. 420, 43 S.W.2d 221 (1931), rehearing denied, 163 Tenn. 648, 45 S.W.2d
528 (1932). Vermont: DeGray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., Inc., 106 Vt. 259, 173 A. 556 (1934).
These latter cases which prohibited supplementary awards did so on non-constitutional
grounds.
17. RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 403 (1934): "Award already had under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of another state will not bar a proceeding under an applicable Act, but the amount paid on a prior award in another state will be credited on the
second award." See also 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403.1 (1935); DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, at 819, 820 (1936). The courts that enforced second
compensation awards unanimously accepted the practice of crediting the second award by
an amount equal to the initial award. In Hughey v. Ware, 34 N.M. 29, 276 P. 27 (1929), the
court refused to enforce a second award because the industrial commission granting it had
failed to give credit to the first award.
18. See note 9 supra. The employee's waiver of any additional common law or statutory
relief apparently did not have effect beyond the borders of the first state.
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ried from state to state. Many jurisdictions took the view that a
compensation proceeding was an action on the contract,1 9 with the
workers' compensation statute of the contract state serving as an
additional term to the employment agreement. These states viewed
a compensation award granted by a state other than the contract
state as a voluntary agreement between the parties.2 0 Although
such an arrangement was entitled to enforcement in other jurisdictions, it did not serve as a final determination of the employee's
rights. The law of the contract state was superior 2 and only the
state of the contract had the power to apply that law. 2 '
Other states considered the situs of the injury as an important
factor in granting supplemental awards. These jurisdictions
claimed an interest in any employee injured within the state borders.2 8 This interest was not extinguished when another state
granted compensation benefits. The state in which the injury occurred was entitled to supplement the employee's recovery to insure the welfare of a worker injured within its borders.2 4
As further justification for grants of supplemental awards, some
states relied upon the fact that a state administrative agency, not a
state court, determined compensation claims.2 5 Compensation
awards did not merit the same full faith and credit effect traditionally afforded to state court judgments because compensation

19.

See R. LAFLAR, CONFLICTS OF LAW, at 327-30 (3d ed. 1979).
20. Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N.E. 847 (1933); McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217,
174 N.E. 338 (1931); Miller v. National Chair Co., 127 N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804 (1941); Sweet
v. Austin Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 381, 171 A.684 (1934); Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column Mould
Co., 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N.Y. Supp. 274 (1917), Price v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 201
S.C. 484, 23 S.E.2d 744 (1942).
21. The decision in Miller v. National Chair Co., 127 N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804 (1941),
typified the attitude taken by many states toward prior awards. In this instance, the North
Carolina Industrial Commission had awarded compensation to a New Jersey resident employed under a New Jersey contract. The New Jersey court upheld the supplemental award
granted there, finding that "[i]t is the undoubted function of the state to decree the legal
consequences that shall attach to such a contract made within its borders." Id. at 808.
22. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
23. Salvation Army v. Industrial Comm'n, 219 Wis. 343, 263 N.W. 349 (1935); Interstate
Power Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N.W. 889 (1931).
24. Id. See generally R. LAFLAR, CONFLICTS OF LAW, at 327 (3d ed. 1979). During the
developmental stages of the workers' compensation remedy, many jurisdictions considered
the compensation proceeding an action in tort. In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693
(1913). Under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, these jurisdictions determined that the law of
the situs of the injury was controlling in a compensation proceeding. This approach may
have influenced later courts which held that the state of the injury retained an interest in
the employee after he was granted relief in another state.
25. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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awards were not judicially determined.2 An administrative decision, though final in the state of its origin, was not necessarily final
in other states under the full faith and credit clause.27
The Magnolia Decision
In its initial application of the full faith and credit clause to supplemental awards, the Supreme Court rejected the state level trend
favoring supplemental benefits. In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt,28 a majority of five Supreme Court justices refused to en-

force a supplemental award on full faith and credit grounds. In
this case, a Louisiana district court granted supplemental compensation relief to an oil field laborer who had previously recovered
under the Texas compensation statute. The Texas statute provided
that a compensation award was granted in lieu of other recoveries
arising from the same injury.29 The Court majority found that although Texas lacked the power to impose this statutory restriction
upon other states,30 the determination of the Texas commission
was entitled to full faith and credit in sister states to the same
degree as a state court judgment.31 The Magnolia Court considered
the decisions of a state commission and a state court equivalent for
26. McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N.E. 338 (1931); Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373,
183 N.E. 847 (1933); Miller v. National Chair Co., 127 N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804 (1941).
27. In Miller v. National Chair Co., 127 N.J.L. 414, 22 A.2d 804 (1941), the New Jersey
court held that the doctrine of res judicata had no application in the workers' compensation
context. The court found that the prior award granted by a North Carolina commission was
an administrative act and did not constitute a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. at 809. This rationale, also adopted in Massachusetts, foreshadowed the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in Thomas to permit supplemental awards.
28. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
29. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8306 § 3 (Vernon) provides, in pertinent part, that
employees subject to the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act "shall have no right of action
against their employer or against any agent, servant or employee of said employer for damages for personal injuries . . . but such employees. . . shall look for compensation solely to
the association [the insurer]."
30. 320 U.S. at 440. A state has the authority to enforce its laws with respect to persons
and events within its borders. As the Court pointed out, however, a state is without power to
give extraterritorial effect to its laws. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914). The Court noted that the full faith and
credit clause rather than the Texas Workers' Compensation Statute, determined the effect
of Texas laws and judgments in other jurisdictions. 320 U.S. at 440.
31. "A compensation award which has become final 'is entitled to the same faith and
credit as a judgment of a court.'" Id. at 435. This assumption by the Court of the equivalence of a commission and a judicial determination was later rejected by the same Court in
similar contexts. Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947); Thomas
v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
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purposes of the full faith and credit clause.2 The Court determined that the national unifying policy underlying the clause dictated equal treatment of commission and judicial decisions.3 The
Court had consistently given state judgments res judicata effect in
sister states, and commission decisions warranted similar treatment. Therefore, the Texas commission decision, final in the state
of Texas, was final in all other jurisdictions as well. The suppleunenforceable as a violamental award granted by Louisiana was
34
clause.
credit
and
faith
full
the
tion of
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black argued that the intent of
the Texas legislature was not to exclude supplemental recovery in
other states, but only to limit the remedies available in Texas. 5
Black contended that by focusing upon statutory intent, the Court
could avoid the constitutional issue.3 The Texas award was intended as a final determination of the employee's rights within the
state. Louisiana was free to provide its own remedy.
McCartin and Its Aftermath
Pursuant to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court,
state courts after Magnolia refused to enforce supplemental com32. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the majority, noted that the injured employee had a
choice of states (Texas or Louisiana) in which to bring a compensation proceeding. The
same choice, however, was not available once an award was granted because of the effect of
the full faith and credit clause. 320 U.S. at 444. See note 31 supra.
33. Id. at 439. Although the Court recognized that a compensation award was not identical to a court judgment, it stressed by its application of the full faith and credit clause that
national policy compelled granting full faith and credit to both. See note 3 supra.
34. Id. at 434.
35. 320 U.S. at 453-55 (Black, J., dissenting).
36. "In the absence of compelling language this Court should not construe the statutes
of Texas in such a manner that grave questions of their constitutionality are raised." Id. at
455. This statement indicates Justice Black's belief that the involvement of the commission
in the first award did not elevate the issue to one of constitutional dimensions.
Nonetheless, Justice Black did directly address the full faith and credit issue. In this argument, he contended that Louisiana's interest in the employee's welfare was sufficient to
overcome any constitutional barrier preventing supplemental awards. The full faith and
credit clause did not compel Louisiana to respect the finality of the Texas award regardless
of the intent of the Texas statute. Louisiana's concern for the injured employee outweighed
the constitutional mandate. The decision to supplement a compensation award belonged to
state legislatures and courts designed to determine this type of policy issue. Id. at 459.
Many commentators shared in Justice Black's disapproval of the majority's reasoning.
E.g., Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Law, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1227-30
(1946); Wolkin, Workmen's Compensation Award-Commonplace or Anomaly in Full
Faith and Credit Pattern, 92 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 405-11 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
Wolkin]; 48 DICK. L. REV. 194 (1944); 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1944); 19 IND. L.J. 268
(1944); 17 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1944); 18 TUL. L. REV. 509 (1944).
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pensation awards. 7 The refusal by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, an otherwise strong supporter of dual recovery,38 to enforce a
second award, prompted the Supreme Court to once again intervene in the area. In Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin,39 the Court unanimously upheld a Wisconsin award which
supplemented an injured employee's recovery under the compensation law of Illinois. The Illinois Compensation Act prohibited an
employee receiving workers' compensation from exercising any additional common law or statutory rights to recovery.4 0 The Court
determined, however, that the Illinois compensation award was not
intended to foreclose an additional recovery under the laws of another state.4 ' According to the Court, the intent of the Illinois statute was presumed to favor supplemental awards in the absence of
"unmistakable language" to the contrary."2 The relief granted by
the State of Wisconsin was a permissible addition to the Illinois
award, and therefore entitled to enforcement.
In further support of the Court's holding, the settlement agreement entered into by the parties pursuant to the Illinois compensation statute contained a stipulation stating that the settlement
did not affect the rights of the applicant under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Wisconsin.' 3 The Court majority, however,
minimized the significance of the stipulation upon the outcome of

37. Arkansas: Butler v. Lee Bros. Trucking Contractors, 206 Ark. 884, 178 S.W.2d 58
(1944) (refusal based on prior Colorado award). Missouri: Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co.,
352 Mo. 993, 180 S.W.2d 678 (1944) (refusal based on prior Kansas award). Wisconsin: McCartin v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522 (1946) (refusal based on prior
Illinois award), rev'd, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
38. See note 16 supra.
39. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 143 (1943) provided, in pertinent part: "No common law or
statutory right to recover damages for injury or death sustained by any employe while engaged in the line of his duty as such employe, other than the compensation herein provided,
shall be available to any employe who is covered by the provisions of this act."
41. 330 U.S. at 630.
42. [Tlhere is nothing in [the Illinois workmen's compensation statute] or in the
decisions thereunder to indicate that it is completely exclusive, that it is designed
to preclude any recovery by proceedings brought in another state . . . [a]nd in
light of the rule that workmen's compensation laws are to be liberally construed in
furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted,. . . we should not readily
interpret such a statute so as to cut off an employee's rights to sue under legislation passed for his benefit. Only some unmistakable language by a state legislature
or judiciary would warrant our accepting such a construction.
Id. at 627-28 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 629.
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the case." The stipulation was not the distinguishing factor which
permitted the Court to reach a result contrary to the Magnolia decision. The reservation was noteworthy to the Court because it expressed what was implicit in the Illinois Compensation Act, i.e.,
supplemental recovery was not precluded by Illnois law.' 5
The Supreme Court in McCartin thus shifted its attention away
from the constitutional controversy that had been addressed by
the Court in Magnolia. The decisive question was not whether the
first award was conclusive of the employee's rights under the full
faith and credit clause, but whether the compensation act supporting the first award contained unequivocal language prohibiting a
second recovery.4 6 The Court in McCartin apparently had adopted
Justice Black's approach in Magnolia.4 7 The intent of the state legislature was considered to be of controlling significance. The policy
of national unity embodied in the full faith and credit clause, and
stressed by the majority in Magnolia, did not compel the McCartin Court to strike down the supplemental award granted by
Wisconsin. i s
In theory, the Magnolia decision survived to a certain extent the
McCartin decision. Arguably, the language of the statutes involved
in each case served to rationalize the different results.49 Commentators agreed, however, that in practical effect Magnolia was all

44. Commentators agree that the McCartin opinion went beyond the award language,
although the language would have provided the distinction necessary to reach the result
obtained. See Larson, Constitutional Law Conflicts and Workmen's Compensation, 1971
DUKE L.J. 1037, 1048-50 (1971); Reese and Johnson, supra note 1, at 159-60; 33 CORNELL
L.Q. 310 (1947); 41 GEo. L.J. 559 (1953).
45. 330 U.S. at 630.
46. The Court in Magnolia had directly rejected this type of approach to the controversy. Whether the compensation statute of the initial award permitted additional recovery
was irrelevant. The first state had no authority to permit or prohibit other states from supplementing awards. 320 U.S. at 440. See notes 30 supra.
47. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
48. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. The policy stressed by the Court in Magnolia received no mention in the McCartin opinion.
49. In order to preserve the Magnolia decision after McCartin, a legitimate distinction
must exist between the cases. Because the McCartin Court failed to expressly overrule the
Magnolia decision, it may be argued that the difference exists in the language of the statutes involved. McCartin upheld a supplemental award because the Illinois statute did not
contain unmistakable language prohibiting additional awards. Presumably, Magnolia rejected the supplemental award granted in Louisiana because the Texas statute contained
language which prohibited supplemental awards. This distinction fails, however, when the
Texas and Illinois statutes are compared. The difference between the two is not so obvious.
See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 7, § 85.30 at 16-19.
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but overruled. 50 Then existing workers' compensation statutes did
not contain the unmistakable language required by McCartin.
Moreover, it was doubtful that states would act to prevent supplemental awards even if it were within their power. After McCartin,
courts consistently upheld the granting of supplemental awards
absent unequivocal statutory language to the contrary."' Until the
Court again addressed the issue in Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co. 52 the controversy appeared to be settled.
THOMAS V. WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT CO.

Factual Background
Halley L. Thomas, a resident of the District of Columbia, was
employed by Washington Gas Light Co. under an employment
agreement made in the District of Columbia."5 In the course of his
employment, Thomas worked in the District of Columbia, Virginia
and Maryland. On January 22, 1971, while working in Arlington,
54
Virginia, he suffered a back injury.
Thomas immediately sought compensation for his injury under
the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Statute. Within two weeks
50.

See R. LAFLAR, CONFLICTS OF LAW, at 334 (3d ed. 1979); G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
at 221 (3d ed. 1963); 4 A. LARSON, supra note 7, §§ 85.10, 85.20 at 15-16,
16-17; Reese and Johnson, supra note 1; 49 COLUM. L. REV. at 159. Accord, RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICTS OF LAW § 403 (as amended 1947): "Award already had under Workmen's Compensation Act of another state will not bar a proceeding under an applicable Act, unless the
Act where the Award was made was designed to preclude the recovery of an award under
any other Act, but the amount paid on a prior award will be credited on the second award."
51. Arizona: City Products Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ariz. App. 286, 506 P.2d 1071
(1973); Jordan v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. 215, 571 P.2d 712 (1977). Arkansas: McGehee
Hatchery Co. v. Gunter, 234 Ark. 113, 350 S.W.2d 608 (1961). California: Reynold Electrical
and Eng'r Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 65 Cal. 2d 429, 55 Cal. Rptr. 248,
421 P.2d 96 (1966). Kentucky: Industrial Track Builders of America v. Lemaster, 429
S.W.2d 403 (1968). Louisiana: Ryder v. Insurance Co. of North America, 282 So. 2d 771;
Griffin v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 283 So. 2d 748 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904.
Massachusetts: Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass. 403, 135 N.E.2d 750 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
927. Michigan: Stanley v. Hinchliffe & Kenner, 395 Mich. 645, 238 N.W.2d 13 (1976). Minnesota: Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Constr. Co., 231 Minn. 433, 431 N.W.2d 792 (1950);
Hubbard v. Midland Constructors, Inc., 269 Minn. 425, 131 N.W.2d 209 (1964). Mississippi:
Harrison Co. v. Norton, 244 Miss. 752, 146 So. 2d 327 (1962). New Jersey: Cramer v. State
Concrete Corp., 39 N.J. 507, 189 A.2d 213 (1963); Hudson v. Kingston Contracting Co., 58
N.J. Super. 455, 156 A.2d 491 (1959); Bowers v. American Bridge Co., 43 N.J. Super. 48, 127
A.2d 580 (1956). North Dakota: Bekkedahl v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 222 N.W.2d 841 (1974). Wisconsin: Spietz v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 168, 28
N.W.2d 354 (1947).
52. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
53. Id. at 264.
54. Id.
CONFLICT OF LAW,
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of the injury, Thomas began receiving benefits pursuant to an "Industrial Commission of Virginia Memorandum of Agreement as to
Payment of Compensation. '"5 5 Several weeks later, the agreement
was approved by the Virginia Industrial Commission, which issued
an award directing that payments continue during incapacity, subject to various contingencies set forth by Virginia law. 56
In 1974, Thomas initiated a workers' compensation claim arising
from the same injury in the District of Columbia.5 7 In an administrative hearing, Washington Gas Light Co. opposed the claim on
the ground that the Virginia Compensation Act excluded any recovery at common law or otherwise, and that the full faith and
credit clause extended this exclusion to the District of Columbia. 5
The administrative law judge granted a supplemental workers'
compensation award to Thomas. 9 He agreed that the Virginia
award was entitled to the same res judicata effect in the District of
Columbia as it had in Virginia. The first award, however, which by
its terms was subject to modification, was not final in Virginia.60
Moreover, the Virginia statute prohibiting other forms of recovery
pertained only to remedies available under Virginia law.6 1 There55. Virginia law provided that after the occurrence of an injury, an employer and an
employee could enter into an agreement with respect to the proper compensation damages.
VA. CODE § 65.1-93 (1973). A memorandum of this agreement was then submitted to the
industrial commission for approval. This procedure permitted the injured party to promptly
receive benefits while remaining under supervision of the industrial commission.
56. 448 U.S. at 264.
57. Id.
58. Id. The District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act, 36 D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 501-02 (1973 & Supp. VII 1980), adopted the terms of the Longshoreman and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1976). The program is administered by
the United States Department of Labor. Initial hearings on claims are conducted by administrative law judges qualified under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1966). The first level of appeal from a
hearing is to the Benefits Review Board appointed by the Secretary of Labor.
VA. CODE § 65.1-40 (1973) provides:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee when he and his employer
have accepted the provisions of this Act respectively to pay and accept compensation on the account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other
rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss
of service or death.
59. 448 U.S. at 265-66.
60. Under traditional principles of res judicata, a judgment, to be conclusive, must be
final. If it is not, the issues litigated remain subject to modification. Although the administrative law judge relied in part upon this principle in permitting a second recovery, this
question of the finality of the compensation award was not discussed by the Supreme Court
in Thomas.
61. Basically, this is the same rationale used by Justice Murphy in McCartin. The Illinois exclusive recovery provision was interpreted to exclude only Illinois remedies. See notes
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fore, upon the introduction of medical evidence at the hearing,
Thomas was awarded permanent total disability benefits, payable
from the date of injury, with credit given for amounts previously
62
paid under the Virginia award.
On review, the Benefits Review Board6 3 upheld the District of
Columbia award. Washington Gas subsequently appealed the
4
Board's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In a brief, unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
Board's decision. In support of its reversal, the court adopted the
rationale of a similar case which had interpreted the McCartin
opinion as focusing on the language of the compensation award
and not the language of the compensation statute.6 5 Under this interpretation, the Supreme Court had permitted the second recovery in McCartin because the initial Illinois award contained a stipulation preserving the employee's rights to recover in a second
state. 6 The Magnolia doctrine remained good law to the extent it
prohibited supplemental awards without similar stipulations." The
circumstances in Thomas were controlled by the Magnolia decision
because the Virginia award did not contain a stipulation permitting additional recovery. 8 Consequently, Thomas was unable to
supplement his compensation under the laws of the District of
Columbia.
The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court in Thomas was confronted with the uneasy
co-existence of the Magnolia and McCartin doctrines. The Fourth

41-42 supra and accompanying text.
62. 448 U.S. at 266.
63. The Benefits Review Board is the first level of appeal in a compensation proceeding
in the District of Columbia. See note 58 supra.
64. Under the District of Columbia workmen's compensation statute, a party to an
award is entitled to seek review in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in
which the injury occurred. 36 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 501-502 (1973); 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.
(1976).
65. In its order, the court of appeals cited Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 627
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 172 (1979). This case explains the court of appeals'
understanding of the Magnolia and McCartin decisions.
66. Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc. 587 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1978).
67. Id.
68. In further support of its position, the Fourth Circuit cited Gasch v. Britton, 202 F.2d
356 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In Gasch, the court found the Magnolia and McCartin decisions consistent, and held that a Maryland award precluded a supplemental award in the District of
Columbia. This interpretation contrasts with the majority understanding of the Magnolia
and McCartin co-existence before Thomas. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
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Circuit's decision underscored the quandary presented by these
doctrines. The conflict furnished the Court with the opportunity to
re-examine Magnolia and McCartin, and to offer a new interpretation of the proper application of the full faith and credit clause to
workers' compensation awards.
Magnolia and McCartin Revisited
The Court in Thomas initially addressed itself to the Magnolia!
McCartin conflict. In contrast to the court of appeals' interpretation, the Supreme Court found that the Magnolia decision did not
survive intact the unanimous holding in McCartin.9 The plurality
conceded that the McCartin court could have relied exclusively
upon the Illinois contract provision preserving the employee's
rights in Wisconsin to distinguish McCartin from Magnolia. The
McCartin Court clearly indicated, however, that it instead chose
the language of the Illinois Compensation Act as the basis for permitting supplemental recovery. This resulted in the "unmistakable
language" test for supplemental recovery.7 0 Furthermore, McCartin was the controlling precedent in the Thomas case because the
Virginia workers' compensation statute did not contain the "unmistakable language" required to prevent dual recovery.7
After establishing the dominance of McCartin, the Thomas plurality re-examined the merits of the "unmistakable language" test.
The Court concluded that the McCartintest was a constitutionally
unsound basis on which to distinguish Magnolia.7 2 Full faith and
credit principles required that a state judgment receive the same
credit, validity, and effect in every other state as it has in the state
of pronouncement. A state was entitled to directly determine the
effect of its judgments within its borders, and in this manner indi-

69. The Supreme Court stated that the McCartin decision "severely curtailed the impact of Magnolia." 448 U.S. at 268. Further in the opinion, the Court declared that the
"rule of construction announced in McCartin left only the narrowest area in which Magnolia could have any further precedential value." Id. at 274.
70. 448 U.S. 269.
71. Id. The Court compared the Illinois statute at issue in McCartin with the Virginia
statute and found that though they were dissimilar, the Virginia statute contained no "unmistakable language" directed at precluding a supplemental compensation award in another
state.
72. Id. at 269-70. The plurality noted that the Court, in its haste to retreat from Magnolia, had fashioned a rule which did not comply with normally accepted full faith and credit
principles. These principles had been established early in the life of the clause by Justices
Marshall and Story and had not subsequently changed. See note 3 supra.
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rectly prescribe the effect of its judgment beyond its borders.7 3
The McCartin test gave the state more authority than the clause
or its congressional implementation had proposed. It empowered a
state to directly determine the extraterritorial effect of its workers'
compensation awards by drafting or construing its statute in "unmistakable language" terms. Under McCartin, the intent of the
legislature, as manifest by its statutory language, determined the
constitutional obligation of its sister states. This "unmistakable
language" rule represented an unwarranted delegation to the states
of the Court's responsibility for final arbitration of full faith and
credit questions.7"
An Interest Analysis
With neither the Magnolia nor McCartin doctrines providing an
acceptable basis for resolving the issue, the plurality embarked
upon a fresh examination of the full faith and credit question. In
so doing, the plurality adopted an interest analysis unprecedented
in the area of state judgments.75 Under this analysis, the Court
identified Virginia's interests in protecting its award from further
proceedings in the District of Columbia. According to the plurality,
Virginia had three distinct interests in the matter: (1) an interest
in limiting the potential liability of the companies doing business
within its borders, (2) an interest in the welfare of the injured employee, and (3) an interest in having the integrity of its formal determinations of contested issues respected by other sovereign
states. The Court evaluated these interests to determine whether
they were of such "controlling importance" as to prevent further
proceedings in the District of Columbia. If the interests of Virginia
were of such significance, the full faith and credit clause operated
76
to prevent a supplemental award in the District.
An authorization . . . of this character is inconsistent with the rule established
in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493,
502, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 940: "This Court must determine for itself how far
the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or denial of rights asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute of another
state."
Id. at 271.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 277-86. Previously, the Court had used a straightforward res judicata approach
to full faith and credit problems. This approach mandated that the court of enforcement
determine the effect of the judgment in the state of pronouncement. See note 3 supra.
76. Under the interest analysis, the burden falls upon the employer to show why a second proceeding should not be conducted. The traditional approach had in practice placed
73.
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The Court determined, however, that Virginia's interests were
not substantial enough to prevent the District of Columbia from
granting a supplemental compensation award." Virginia's policy of
limiting the liability of the employer was not of a controlling nature because Thomas, the injured employee, had at the outset a
choice of forums in which to bring his claim. Thomas had a right
to bring a claim under one of two state compensation statutes because he had been injured in Virginia while executing an employment contract made in the District of Columbia." In practical effect, Washington Gas had to calculate the limit of its potential
liability according to the greater of the two recoveries because it
could not predict in advance which statute Thomas would invoke. 79 Virginia was entitled to set a lower recovery rate than the
District, but as long as the District's compensation rate was available to Thomas, Virginia's policy remained contingent upon
Thomas' choice. The principle of full faith and credit did not require a state to subordinate its compensation policies to those of
another."0 Consequently, it did not impose one state's policy of
limiting liability upon another state's compensation scheme.
Virginia's second interest in the matter, that of providing adequate compensation to the injured employee, did not preclude supplemental recovery. This concern was furthered by a second award.
The District of Columbia promised to enforce the award already
granted to Thomas and to supplement his recovery through a second recovery. Any inadequacy in the initial recovery could thus be
corrected in the later commission's proceeding."'
The ultimate issue was whether Virginia's interest in the integrity of its tribunal's determinations prohibited a second proceeding
in the District of Columbia. The Magnolia Court had placed the
decision of a state administrative commission on equal ground with

the burden on the employee to show why the first judgment should not be conclusive.
77. 448 U.S. at 277-86.
78. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 (1935) had
established that an employee who had entered into his employment contract in one state,
but had been injured in another, was entitled to bring a claim in the state of the contract,
even though the state of the injury claimed exclusive interest in the matter. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), had established the converse, i.e., an injured employee was entitled to bring a claim in the state of the injury, even
though the state of the contract claimed an exclusive remedy.
79. 448 U.S. at 279-80.
80. Id. at 279, citing, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421-24 (1979); Crider v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
81. 448 U.S. at 280.
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judgments rendered by state courts. Under the straightforward application of full faith and credit required in Magnplia, the integrity
of the state commission was at stake in a second proceeding.8 2 The
Thomas plurality, however, rejected this application of the full
faith and credit clause to administrative awards. The supporting
authority in Magnolia did not warrant elevating administrative determinations to the level of judicial determinations."3 Moreover, a

82. In finding that a compensation award was equivalent to a court judgment, the Magnolia Court assumed that a state commission and a state court are of an equal stature.
Therefore, the integrity of the commission was threatened by a second proceeding to the
same degree as would be a state court. In contrast, commentators had suggested that the
nature of a state commission differs from that of a state court, and contended that a second
proceeding does not have the same detrimental effect upon a state commission as upon a
state court. See generally Cheatham, supra note 3, at 343-46; Reese and Johnson, supra
note 1, at 176-77; Wolkin, supra note 36, at 405-08.
83. The Magnolia Court had relied on Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Schendel,
270 U.S. 611 (1926) for the proposition that a compensation award granted in one state
barred further relief in sister states. The Thomas plurality did not share this interpretation.
In Schendel, the Court found that an Iowa compensation award, which was grounded on a
contested factual finding that the deceased employee was engaged in intrastate commerce,
precluded a subsequent judgment rendered in Minnesota pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Recovery under the terms of the FELA had required the Minnesota court
to reach a contrary factual determination that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce. On this basis, the Court vacated the Minnesota judgment as to the issue of the activity's nature. Nonetheless, the Minnesota verdict for the injured employee was affirmed because the earlier award was not final and therefore not res judicata in Iowa.
The plurality interpreted Schendel as representing the unexceptional full faith and credit
principle that resolution of factual matters underlying a judgment must be given the same
res judicata effect in the forum state as in the state of origin. Further relief was barred in,
Schendel, not because the compensation award had extinguished all claims between the
parties, but because Minnesota could not grant an FELA judgment and also respect prior
factual determinations of Iowa.
In contrast, a second, supplemental workers' compensation award in Thomas and Magnolia did not call for a resolution or any factual finding contrary to the first state's determination. In both of these cases, a second recovery in full compliance with previously determined
factual issues was possible. The Magnolia Court had ignored this difference and, in effect,
broadened the application of full faith and credit so as to bar further relief under other
workers' compensation statutes, regardless of the factual consistencies. The Thomas Court
found this extension of the full faith and credit clause unwarranted.
The term "res judicata" generally denotes two things with regard to a valid final judgment: (1) that the judgment, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent
action between the parties upon the same claim or demand; and (2) that the judgment constitutes an estoppel between the parties as to matters which were necessarily litigated and
determined although the claim or demand in the subsequent action is different. Under the
first proposition, the judgment operates to bar relitigation of all grounds for recovery that
were available to the parties before the court rendering the judgment, regardless of whether
all grounds for recovery were judicially determined. Under the second proposition, the judgment prevents the parties from relitigating those matters that were determined. 1B J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.405(1] (3d ed. 1974).
The Thomas plurality had apparently taken cognizance of this two-part definition, and
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significant difference indeed existed between administrative proceedings and court judgments. Because the jurisdiction of a state
court was far greater than that of a commission, and because a
state court was competent to decide issues which a commission is
not, the full faith and credit clause had greater impact upon a
state judgment than upon a commission determination.8
As the Supreme Court emphasized, the determinations of a state
court and state commission are not equivalent. While both a state
court and a state industrial commission are empowered to resolve
factual disputes that arise between the parties before them,8 5 only
a state court of general jurisdiction is competent to determine the
rights and liabilities of the parties which are created under the
laws of other states."a A state court performs this task through its
choice of law determinations. At the outset of a proceeding, a court
considering a matter involving the interests of more than one state
must determine the appropriate law to be applied to the factual
situation. The state tribunal may give another state's interest a
higher priority and apply the law of that state.87 In so doing, the
state tribunal determines the rights of the parties that exist both
inside and outside of the forum state. When the determination
reached by the state court is final, this judgment, like the factual
determination, becomes conclusive in all future proceedings on the
same matter. The full faith and credit clause renders this determination conclusive in other states and bars further relief upon the
same claim. 88
In contrast, a state industrial commission does not typically have
the same authority to determine a party's extraterritorial rights.8 9
A state commission is limited by statute to applying the compensainterpreted Schendel as representing only the second proposition that a compensation proceeding, as it determines the facts of a case, estops a party from later challenging those facts
in a second proceeding. The Magnolia Court attempted to take Schendel one step further
by holding that a compensation award barred future claims brought under other states'
workers' compensation statutes. The plurality viewed this as improper. See 448 U.S. at 28081.
84. Id. at 282-83.

85. "To be sure, as was held in Schendel, the factfindings of state administrative tribunals are entitled to the same res judicata effect in the second State as findings by a court."
Id. at 281.
86. Id. at 282.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. "Although a Virginia court is free to recognize the perhaps paramount interests of
another State by choosing to apply that State's law in a particular case, the Industrial Commission of Virginia does not have that power." Id.
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tion scheme of the state in which it presides. A commission does
not, therefore, resolve all the claims of the parties before it. The
compensation award represents a resolution of the parties' rights
in a single state. The Virginia award in this instance represented a
conclusive determination of Thomas' claims in Virginia. In this respect, and to this degree, the award was entitled to full faith and
credit protection. Since Thomas' rights to recovery in the District
had not been considered, the full faith and credit clause did not
prevent the District of Columbia from considering them in its own
proceeding.90 Therefore, the supplemental award, granted under
another state's compensation
act, was a constitutionally acceptable
91
form of dual recovery.

In its neoteric analysis, then, the plurality concluded that Virginia had no legitimate interest in preventing another state from
supplementing its compensation award. The full faith and credit
clause required only that the factual finding of Virginia be given
the same effect outside the state. The plurality thus reached a result consistent with the prior determinations made pursuant to the
McCartin doctrine. With the plurality's interest analysis providing
the basis for permitting supplemental awards, the McCartin approach was no longer necessary. Furthermore, the plurality recommended that the Magnolia decision be overruled. 9"
The three justices who concurred in the Thomas opinion shared
in the plurality's conclusion that the- full faith and credit clause
permitted the granting of supplemental compensation awards.
They chose, however, to retain the McCartin approach. The Virginia statute did not contain "unmistakable language" prohibiting
a supplemental award. For the concurring justices, this fact entitled the District of Columbia to grant further relief.9 The
two dissenting justices rejected both the interest analysis and
the McCartin test. Consistent with the Magnolia decision, they argued that the Virginia award, final under the laws of Virginia, was
90. "Full faith and credit must be given to the determination that the Virginia Commission had the authority to make; but by a parity of reasoning, full faith and credit need not
be given to determinations that it had no power to make." Id. at 283 (footnote omitted).
91. The integrity of the Virginia Industrial Commission was threatened by a second proceeding only to the extent that the second proceeding might have reversed the determinations made by the commission. Since the supplemental award of the District complied with
the factual determinations and the resolution of Thomas' rights in Virginia, the integrity of
the Virginia Commission was preserved. The District of Columbia was able to resolve
Thomas' rights in the District because they had not been previously decided. Id. at 284.
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id. at 286-90.
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conclusive in all other jurisdictions including the District of
Columbia.0 '
RAMIFICATIONS

In Thomas, the Supreme Court, for the second consecutive time,
approved the granting of a supplemental compensation award. The
Court thus appears committed to a consistent application of the
full faith and credit clause. When all three opinions rendered in
Thomas are considered, however, certainty and predictability fade.
Inconsistency and contradiction permeate the decision. All members of the Court found the continued co-existence of the Magnolia and McCartin decisions to some degree objectionable. Yet, both
decisions remain in effect after Thomas. Six justices of the Court
rejected, as constitutionally unsound, the "unmistakable language"
test of McCartin. Since it was not overruled, however, the McCartin approach remains a vital factor in enforcement of supplemental
awards. As a result of the inconsistent rationales propounded in
Thomas, the constitutional foundation of supplemental compensation awards remains unsettled.
The Future of Supplemental Awards
An injured employee after Thomas might have more difficulty
enforcing a supplemental award before the Supreme Court than
the result in Thomas initially indicates. The four members of the
plurality, Justices Stevens, Brennan, Stewart and Blackmun, appear ready to enforce supplemental compensation awards irrespective of the statutory language authorizing the initial compensation
award.9 5 The plurality's criticism of the McCartin test and its
adoption of an interest analysis indicate a strong preference for the
enforcement of supplemental awards in general. The plurality's inability to recommend that McCartin be overruled, however, casts
some doubt upon the predictability of their votes." If the Court
were asked to enforce a supplemental award which was prohibited
under the statutory language supporting the initial award, the plurality would have to directly address the McCartin issue. A commitment to the principle of stare decisis might compel some jus94. Id. at 290-96.
95. See notes 75-91 supra and accompanying text.
96. The plurality's strong criticism of the McCartin test is clearly inconsistent with their
final recommendation that only the Magnolia test be overruled. Furthermore, the significance of the interest analysis is left in doubt by the plurality's failure to depict it as the only
rationale for the result reached.
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tices to abandon the interest analysis and invalidate the
supplemental award.
The two dissenters in Thomas, Justices Rehnquist and Marshall,
are the most predictable of the Court members. An injured employee could expect both dissenters to vote against enforcement of
supplemental recovery regardless of the statutory language controlling the initial recovery. The dissenting justices found Magnolia to
be the sounder doctrine, and thus favor a complete prohibition of
supplemental compensation awards pursuant to a straightforward
application of the full faith and credit clause.
With four justices in favor of supplemental recovery and two
clearly opposed, any determination of the status of a supplemental
award necessarily rests with the concurring justices: Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Powell and Justice White. Their opinion in
Thomas assumes special significance because a supplemental
award cannot be upheld without their support. For the concurring
justices in Thomas, the status quo as represented by the "unmistakable language" test was the more appropriate basis for approving the District of Columbia's supplemental award. 9" Presumably,
an employee would have to demonstrate that supplemental recovery was statutorily permissible in the state of his initial recovery in
order to secure the support of the three concurring justices. Assuming the absence of statutory language prohibiting such recovery, the final result would be a seven to two decision in favor of the
supplemental award.
Should the statute controlling the original award specifically
prohibit second recoveries in sister states, however, a curious
transformation would occur. The three justices concurring in the
Thomas decision would become the new plurality denying additional recovery. The dissenters, as supporters of the Magnolia approach, would concur in this result. Finally, the members of the
Thomas plurality, favoring supplemental awards, irrespective of
the statutory language, would assume the roles of dissenters.
Although the likelihood that such a case will arise is small, each
97. 448 U.S. at 290. The dissenting justices incorporated Justice Stone's rationale in
Magnolia into their opinion. They stated that the injured party was free to pursue his remedy in Virginia or the District of Columbia, but once he had chosen a jurisdiction and obtained recovery, he was barred from recovering elsewhere for the same injury.
98. "McCartin,rather than Magnolia, is controlling as between the two precedents since
the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act lacks the 'unmistakable language' which McCartin requires if a workmen's compensation award is to preclude a subsequent award in
another State." Id. at 289-90.
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state has the opportunity to add "unmistakable language" to its
workers' compensation statute and to contribute to the present
confusion in the area. 99 The McCartin doctrine continues as the
controlling test even after the Thomas decision. Furthermore, the
concurring justices accepted the McCartin approach to supplemental awards on the basis of stare decisis and not upon a firm conviction in its merits. ' " Justice White, writing the concurring opinion,
found that McCartin rested on questionable grounds. The concurring opinion found that the Magnolia decision expressed the
sounder rationale. To the three concurring justices, there was no
overriding differences between workers' compensation awards and
state court judgments that justify different treatment."0 ' The concurring opinion thus managed to multiply the confusion over supplemental awards. Today, if the appropriate arguments were
brought before the Court, it appears that the three concurring justices would abandon the McCartin test and support an application
of the full faith and credit clause to bar supplemental recovery altogether. An injured employee seeking enforcement of his second
recovery after Thomas thus faces a very uncertain future.
The Future of the Interest Analysis
The interest-balancing analysis adopted by the plurality in
Thomas marks a fresh approach to the full faith and credit clause
with respect to state tribunals. Under traditional treatment of the
clause, a court determines the res judicata effect of a judgment in
the state of pronouncement and imposes the same effect upon the
parties in the state of enforcement. The new analysis requires that
the forum court evaluate the various interests of the state of pronouncement. If these interests weigh against secondary relief, the
99. At present, only Nevada appears to have included the language necessary to prevent
supplemental awards:
[I]f an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state receives
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment
outside this state, and he . .. accepts any compensation or benefits under the
provisions of this chapter, the acceptance of such compensation shall constitute a
waiver by such employee. . . of all rights and remedies against the employer at
common law or given under the laws of any other state ....
NEv. REV. STAT. § 616.525 (1979) (emphasis added). Apparently, an employee who has initially recovered under the Nevada statute will be unable to seek supplemental recovery elsewhere even after the Thomas decision.
100. The concurring justices observed that "McCartin has been on the books for over 30
years and has been widely interpreted by state and federal courts as substantially limiting
Magnolia. 448 U.S. 289.
101. Id.
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second state is prohibited from supplementing the judgment.
Future application of the interest analysis is doubtful because
the majority of the Court was not persuaded of its merits. The concurring and dissenting opinions both rejected the new approach.
Although Justice White agreed that a re-examination of the
clause's significance was necessary,1 02 he viewed the plurality's
method of analysis as incompatible with the function of the clause
as a national unifying force. In permitting a court of enforcement
to weigh the various interests of the state of pronouncement, the
balancing analysis offered a non-neutral state the opportunity to
advance its own interests in the matter.1 0 3 The full faith and credit
clause was intended to eliminate this opportunity.' 4
The dissenting justices found no need for a new approach to the
full faith and credit clause. For them, the Magnolia decision set
forth the appropriate method of applying the constitutional clause
to workers' compensation awards. Furthermore, an interest-balancing test was undesirable in any context. Inherent in this approach,
they contended, was the risk that a court might undervalue and
overlook important concerns.10 5
Other Full Faith and Credit Contexts
The Supreme Court's decision in Thomas represents an exception to well established full faith and credit principles.1 06 After

102. Id. at 288.
103. The concurring opinion noted that the new analysis proposed by the plurality contained the same weakness of the McCartin test. The Thomas plurality found that the "unmistakable language" test permitted the first state, through its legislature, to advance its
own interests by declaring the extraterritorial effect of its award. Justice White viewed the
balancing test as permitting the second state, through its judiciary, to advance its interests
by deciding the extraterritorial effect of another state's award. Both tests were contrary to
the national unifying policy underlying the full faith and credit clause. See notes 3 and 48
supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 3 supra.
105. 448 U.S. at 292-93. The dissent argued that the plurality undervalued Virginia's
interest in limiting the liability of a business operating in its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
plurality also discounted Virginia's effort and expense in rendering the initial award. Virginia had, in effect, unnecessarily expended both because the District of Columbia was permitted to award a duplicate remedy.
106. See note 3 supra. Exceptions to the full faith and credit clause as applied to state
judgments are rare. State penal judgments, Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), and
state judgments purporting to convey property in another state, Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1
(1909), are among the few state judgments which are not given full faith and credit in sister
states. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 103 (1969) proposes:
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized
or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 12

Thomas, the rule that a state tribunal's decision is entitled to the
same res judicata effect in every state is not applicable to workers'
compensation decisions. When the Court carves out such an exception to a well-established principle of law, the question arises
whether the exception marks a new trend in the law or serves as
precedent for future exceptions.
All three opinions in Thomas suggest that the exception to the
full faith and credit clause recognized in this case is of limited
scope. In the process of applying its interest analysis, the plurality
created a very narrow exception to the traditional application of
full faith and credit to state determinations. To the plurality, the
workers' compensation exception turned on the fact that a compensation commission, unlike a court of general jurisdiction, was
restricted to applying its own law in a compensation proceeding." 7
In drawing this distinction, the plurality affirmed the principle
that a decision made by a court of general jurisdiction is safely
harbored by the full faith and credit clause. Thus, only administrative determinations made through a legislative choice of laws rule
are affected by the exception. And even these determinations are
entitled to full faith and credit with respect to the resolution of
factual issues. 08s The extent of the exception is, therefore, severely
restricted.
The remaining justices, a majority of the Court, were uncomfortable even with this narrow exception. The concurring opinion criticized this distinction, in part, because it suggested further exceptions to the clause. 0 9 The concurring justices also found the
plurality's sanction of a second compensation proceeding to be in
direct conflict with the underlying purposes of the full faith and
the national policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an improper
interference with important interests of the sister State.
The reporters suggest that at some point the national policy of full faith and credit may be
overridden by a state's important interests. There is little case support for this proposition,
however. The comment accompanying § 103 cites for support Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945). In Williams, the Supreme Court allowed North Carolina to re-examine
the jurisdictional foundation for a Nevada ex parte divorce proceeding. The North Carolina
court determined that the Nevada court did not have jurisdiction to grant the divorce, and
then found the divorced party guilty of bigamy in North Carolina. Lack of jurisdiction,
however, is not a true exception to the clause's strict enforcement policy; nor does it support
the Restatement's "important state interest" approach. For further criticism of the Restatement proposal, see Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal For Its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 1230, 1240 (1965).
107. See notes 82-91 supra and accompanying text.
108. See note 83 supra.
109. Id. at 286-90.
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credit clause. The exception ignored the principle of finality embodied in the clause, resulting in a gross injustice to the defendant
who was thus burdened with multiple lawsuits based upon the
same facts.'1 Furthermore, the Thomas exception undermined the
unifying effect of the constitutional clause. The Magnolia decision,
which recognized no exception for supplemental awards, was cited
by the concurring justices as the better approach."'
The dissent was equally antagonistic toward the Thomas exception. It maintained that an exception to the traditional full faith
and credit approach results in duplication of effort and expenses
rendered in the applicant's behalf.'" The restricted jurisdiction of
the compensation commission did not justify the waste caused by
duplication. The injured employee, according to the dissent, was
not forced to choose one state's compensation scheme over another. He was free to choose the applicable scheme by selecting the
forum in which to file his initial claim. Finally, the dissent expressed concern that the Thomas exception would inject confusion
into the modern trend toward quasi-judicial resolutions by tribunals of limited jurisdiction. I I This hostility directed by the dissenting and concurring opinions at an already narrowly drawn exception, indicates that the use of Thomas as precedent for future
exceptions to the full faith and credit is quite unlikely.
CONCLUSION

Historically, application of the full faith and credit clause to
supplemental workers' compensation awards has been plagued by
pendulation. In two earlier decisions, the Supreme Court stated
discordant rationales and came to opposite conclusions. In
Thomas, the Court sought to inject a degree of certainty into the
area, finding for a second time that the full faith and credit clause
did not prohibit a supplemental compensation award. Through an
uneasy mixture of old and new law, however, the Court spawned
further inconsistencies. The new law suggested by the plurality,
the interest balancing analysis, was not well received by the majority of the Court. Its future junction is therefore questionable. The
old law, the McCartin "unmistakable language" test, received the
110. Id. at 289.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 293-94. See note 105 supra.
113. Id. at 295-96. The dissenting justices noted that this trend in the law warns against
not only the development of the Thomas exception to the clause in other areas, but also
even the narrow application of the plurality's exception.
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tentative support of only three members of the Court. Its future,
then, is also doubtful. Furthermore, with the Court's holding precariously rooted in such unstable ground, the effective use of
Thomas as precedent in other full faith and credit arenas appears
improbable. In the end, the Thomas decision merely luminates the
oscillation which the Court sought to eliminate.
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